【1142期】 5月31日微观经济学学术讲座：Dynamic Public Good Provision under Irreversibility and Complementarity（邓留纯，助教授，耶鲁-新加坡国立大学学院）

【主题】Dynamic Public Good Provision under Irreversibility and Complementarity

【报告人】邓留纯（助教授，耶鲁-新加坡国立大学学院）

【时间】2023年5月31日周三14:00-15:30

【地点】亚搏手机版APP下载701会议室

【语言】英文

【摘要】We study public good provision and technology investment when two parties alternate political control stochastically. In each period, the incumbent decides how much public good to provide and how much to invest in a technology that lowers the future cost of public good provision. The two parties value public good differently (party $H$ assigns a higher weight and $L$ a lower weight). This difference represents the degree of polarization. We obtain the following results in Markov Perfect equilibrium in the infinite-horizon game: (i) When polarization is low, steady-state distribution is invariant to the degree of reversibility of the investment.  When polarization is high, party $H$ invests more in technology and both parties provide more public good in steady state when investment is irreversible than when reversible. (ii) Higher power turnover results in higher levels of technology stock and more public good provision if polarization is low. (iii) Under high power turnover, as parties get more polarized, the expected technology stock and provision of public good in steady state first fall, then jump upward as irreversibility starts to bind.