【主题】Are Simple Mechanisms Optimal When Agents are Unsophisticated?
【报告人】Jiangtao Li（常任副教授，新加坡管理大学）
【时间】2023年6月16日周五14:00-15:30
【地点】亚搏手机版APP下载701会议室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We study the design of mechanisms involving agents that have limited strategic sophistication. We define a mechanism to be simple if---given the assumed level of strategic sophistication---agents can determine their optimal strategy. We examine whether it is simple for the mechanism designer who faces strategically unsophisticated agents to offer a simple mechanism. We show that when the designer uses a mechanism that is not simple, while she loses the ability to predict play, she may nevertheless be better off no matter how agents resolve their strategic confusion.
【报告人简介】李江涛，新加坡管理大学亚搏手机版APP下载副教授，主要研究领域为机制设计。研究成果发表于Econometrica（2篇）, Journal of Economic Theory（2篇）, 和Games and Economic Behavior（5篇）。担任Journal of Mathematical Economics, Mathematical Social Sciences, 和International Journal of Economic Theory副主编。